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11. Introduction
Consider a market consisting of agents with diﬀerent demand functions or correspon-
dences and diﬀerent incomes. The typical question in demand aggregation is to ask for the
conditions which will guarantee that aggregate demand takes on a particular property.
There are two mutually non-exclusive approaches to problems of this sort. The more
obvious way is simply to ask for the conditions on individual demand which will guaran-
tee that the aggregate property holds. This approach is most useful when the property
required is straightforwardly aggregable. So one way of ensuring that aggregate demand is
a continuous function of price is to assume that individual demand is a continuous function
of price, which in turn follows from preferences which are continuous and strictly convex.
Sometimes the solution is less straightforward. For example, it is well known that aggregate
demand need not satisfy the strong or weak axioms, even when the agents who make up
that market satisfy those properties. In these instances, stronger properties have to be
imposed at the individual level to obtain the desired aggregate properties. For example,
the strong axiom (essentially the existence of a representative consumer) is guaranteed if
all agents have preferences representable by the Gorman polar form; the weak axiom in the
aggregate holds provided agents individually obey the law of demand.
This approach to aggregation problems is distinguished by two features: the property
required at the individual level are at least as strong as the aggregate property required and
once it is satisﬁed, the precise distribution of demand and income characteristics does not
matter. The focus of this paper is on another approach in which these features are reversed.
In this second approach, the assumptions made at the individual level are weaker than, or
2at least diﬀerent from, the aggregate property required, and the aggregate property arises
because of the distributional assumptions imposed. This approach is suﬃciently common
that it is worth giving it a name. We propose that it be called heterosis. The suﬃx ‘-osis’,
following the Greek, is used in English to denote a process or condition: heterosis refers to
the phenomenon in which the distributional characteristics, i.e., heterogeneity, of a market,
imbues market demand with properties which are not always present at the individual level.1
Examples of heterosis abound. An application of Lyapunov’s theorem guarantees that
when the measure space of agents is atomless, the aggregate demand correspondence is
convex valued, even when each type of agent may not have a convex valued demand corre-
spondence (see Hildenbrand (1974)). Beyond this, there is a substantial literature on when
a market will have a continuous or smooth demand function, even when non-convexities
are present at the individual level (see, for example, Dierker et al (1980)). Another well
known example of heterosis is the result due to Hildenbrand (1983). It says that a market
in which all agents have the same demand function which obeys the weak axiom will satisfy
a stronger property - the law of demand - provided the income distribution has a downward
sloping density function.
The focus of this paper is the family of heterotic models ﬁrst studied by Grandmont
(1992). Grandmont considers a market consisting of agents with the same income and
diﬀerent demand functions belonging to the same aﬃne equivalence class. Aﬃne transfor-
mations and equivalence classes are deﬁned in Section 3; what should be noted here is that
aﬃne transformations preserve rationality properties like the weak and strong axioms, so
that Grandmont’s model has the important feature that all agents in the market can satisfy
3the classical rationality restrictions, even though these restrictions are not required for his
aggregation result. Assuming that there are l goods in this market, demand functions can
then be parametrized by elements in Rl. When the density function on the parameter is suf-
ﬁciently ﬂat in some precise sense, market demand becomes increasingly Cobb-Douglas like,
i.e., the proportion of market expenditure devoted each good is approximately constant.
A model closely related to Grandmont’s is the heterotic model of Quah (1997). By
modifying the parametric assumptions in Grandmont (1997), Quah identiﬁes the conditions
under which a market will take on homothetic-like (but not necessarily Cobb-Douglas-
like) properties; in particular, aggregate demand is approximately linear in income and the
aggregate of income eﬀects is approximately positive semi-deﬁnite.
Section 2 of this paper is a careful re-examination of the mathematical features common
to these models. We show that what underlies these results is really a theorem about
translations of a function, which can be stated in the following way: a translation of the
function f : Rl → Rm is another function ft, where t is in Rl and ft(x)=f(x + t); under
certain assumptions, on any bounded subset X of Rl, there exists density functions h such
that F(x)=

Rl ft(x)h(t)dt becomes approximately independent of x in X. The main
mathematical result of this paper is that by endowing the set of functions with a suitable
topology and with certain additional assumptions, the closure of the set of translations of f
becomes a compact set. On this compact set of functions, there exists a distribution which
guarantees that the average function is a constant, i.e., exactly independent of x.
After establishing this mathematical result in Section 2, we go on to apply it in Section
3. We identify the assumptions which guarantee that the distribution of demand is such
4that the market’s average expenditure share on each good is independent of prices, i.e., the
market demand function behaves as though it is generated by a Cobb-Douglas preference.
This result is therefore an exact version of Grandmont’s theorem. We then apply the result
to Quah’s model, where we identify distributional conditions under which market demand
becomes exactly linear in income and the aggregate of income eﬀects is exactly positive
semi-deﬁnite. Section 3 also includes a brief discussion of the relationship between this
paper and the exact aggregation results in Giraud and Maret (2001).
An issue which has attracted some debate recently is the precise nature of the heterosis at
work in Grandmont’s model. Hildenbrand and Kneip (1999) have a model in which agents’
individual behavior are allowed to depart from the Cobb-Douglas form, but large departures
occur for diﬀerent agents at diﬀerent parts of the price space (hence the “heterogeneity” in
the title of their paper). This has the eﬀect that at any single price vector, only a small
fraction of agents actually have large deviations from Cobb-Douglas behavior and so Cobb-
Douglas behavior holds approximately in aggregate. They show that Grandmont’s model,
with some additional assumptions, can be understood as an example of heterosis in this
sense.2 This is a legitimate view of the mechanism at work behind Grandmont’s theorem,
but it is not the only possible view. In particular we show in Section 4 that the aggregate
Cobb-Douglas behavior guaranteed by the theorem could arise from complementary or sign-
balancing heterogeneity. (The terms are loosely borrowed from B. de Villemeur (2001) and
Hildebrand and Kneip (1999) respectively.) In other words, the average expenditure share
on each good is approximately constant because, while some agents may increase their
expenditure share on a good as prices change, this is perfectly balanced by other agents
5who choose to reduce their expenditure share on the same good. This is unlike the situation
depicted in Hildenbrand and Kneip (1999) because the set of agents who deviate signiﬁcantly
from Cobb-Douglas behavior at each price need not be small.
2. The Main Results
Let P be a set and consider a function ¯ s : P × Rl → Rm.W i t h a n y t in Rl,w ec a n
deﬁne st, a function from P × Rl to Rm by st(p,x)=¯ s(p,x + t). So st is just a translation
of ¯ s. We denote by S the set {st : t ∈ Rl}.I f ¯ s(p,·) is measurable and bounded, then
for any density function h : Rl → R+, the integral

st(p,x)h(t)dt exists; abusing notation
somewhat, we will denote it by sh(p,x). So sh(p,x) is the average value of st(p,x) when t
is distributed according to h. The next result is essentially due to Grandmont (1992) and
is at the heart of his aggregation results.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose ¯ s(p,·) is measurable and |¯ sj(p,·)| is bounded by M.I f t h e
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This last term is in turn bounded by B(h)max 1≤i≤l{|xi − ˜ xi|}.Q E D





h(p, ˜ x)| becomes small as well; more precisely, on any bounded subset of Rl, s
j
h(p,·) will
become increasingly independent of x if h can be found such that B(h) is arbitrarily small.
It is not hard to see that such density functions exist. First we choose any density function
h such that B(h) is ﬁnite. Then one can easily verify that for the sequence of density
functions {hn}n≥1 where hn(t)=n−1h(n−1t), B(hn) tends to zero as n tends to inﬁnity.
What we aim to do is to establish the existence of a distribution on S (or, as it turns
out, on a slightly larger set) such that its average value becomes exactly, rather than just
approximately, independent of x. To do this, we need to impose more structure on the
problem.
We assume that P is a metric space; we also assume that it is σ-compact, by which
we mean that there is a sequence of compact sets {Pn}n≥1 such that ∪∞
n=1Pn = P and
Pn ⊂ Po
n+1, where the latter refers to the interior of Pn+1. (Note that these conditions
permit the set P to be compact.) The set of continuous functions from P × Rl to Rm,t o




2−n maxPn×Tn |f(p,x) − g(p,x)|
1+m a x Pn×Tn |f(p,x) − g(p,x)|
,
7where the sequence of sets {Tn}n≥1 is chosen to have the same properties in Rl as {Pn}n≥1
has in P. The topology generated by d coincides with the topology of uniform convergence
on compacta. The next two lemmas are straightforward and establish the properties we
need.
Lemma 2.2. If ¯ s : P × Rl → Rm is continuous, so are the following functions:
(i) ψ : Rl → C(P × Rl,R m), where ψ(t)=st and
(ii) Φ:P × Rl × C(P × Rl,R m) → Rm, where Φ(p,x,s)=s(p,x).
Proof: Let M be any compact subset of P ×Rl and let tn be a sequence in Rl converging
to t. It is easy to check that there is M , also compact, such that (p,x + tn)i si nM  for
all (p,x)i nM and tn, n ≥ 1. Then |stn(p,x) − st(p,x)| = |¯ s(p,x + tn) − ¯ s(p,x + t)| can
be made uniformly small on M for a large enough n since ¯ s is continuous and therefore
uniformly continuous on M . This establishes the continuity of ψ.
To show that Φ is continuous, let (pn,x n,s n) converge to (p,x,s). Note that
|sn(pn,x n) − s(p,x)|≤| sn(pn,x n) − s(pn,x n)| + |s(pn,x n) − s(p,x)|.
Since the sequence (pn,x n) is contained in a compact set, and sn converges to s uniformly
on compact sets, the ﬁrst term on the right hand side can be made arbitrarily small for
large enough n. Similarly, the continuity of s guarantees that the second term on the right
hand side can also be made arbitrarily small for large n.Q E D
Lemma 2.3. Suppose that ¯ s : P × Rl → Rm is uniformly continuous, and for every p,
¯ s(p,·) is bounded. Then ¯ S (the closure of S) is a compact set.
Proof: Let {sn}n≥1 where sn = stn for some tn in Rl be a sequence of functions in S.
We need only show that it has a subsequence converging to a function in C(P × Rl,R m).
8Since sn(p,x)=¯ s(p,x + tn)a n d¯ s(p,·) is uniformly bounded, the sequence sn is pointwise
bounded. The sequence is also equicontinuous, because ¯ s is uniformly continuous. By
Ascoli’s Theorem (see Royden (1968)), there is a subsequence snk and a function g in
C(P ×Rl,R m) such that snk tends to g pointwise and uniformly on compact sets. It is now
trivial to check that d(snk,g) tends to zero as nk tends to inﬁnity. QED
Our ﬁnal result is an exact aggregation theorem, analogous to the approximate aggre-
gation result of Proposition 2.1.
Theorem 2.4. Suppose that ¯ s : P × Rl → Rm is uniformly continuous, and for every
p, ¯ s(p,·) is bounded. Suppose also that H : V × Rm → Rn, where V is a metric space, is
a continuous function. Then there exists a continuous function H∗ : V × P → Rn and a







Proof: Let hn be a sequence of density functions deﬁned on Rl such that B(hn)g o e st o
zero as n goes to inﬁnity. Let νn be the probability measure on Rl induced by hn. This in
turn induces a probability measure µn on ¯ S,g i v e nb yµn(S )=νn(ψ−1(S )) for any Borel
measurable set S  in ¯ S. The continuity, hence measurability, of ψ (Lemma 2.2) guarantees
that this deﬁnition is good. By Lemma 2.3, ¯ S is compact, so there is a subsequence µnk
which converges weakly to a measure µ∗ (see Billingsley (1968)). We wish to show that

¯ S H(v,Φ(p,x,s))dµ∗ =

¯ S H(v,Φ(p, ˜ x,s))dµ∗ for all x and ˜ x in Rl.
9To see this we note that |

¯ S H(v,Φ(p,x,s)) − H(v,Φ(p, ˜ x,s))dµ∗| is less than
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The function H(v,Φ(p,x,·)) is uniformly continuous and bounded when restricted to the
compact set ¯ S (by Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3), so the weak convergence of µnk to µ∗ guaran-
tees that when nk is arbitrarily large, the ﬁrst term (and similarly the last term) will be




H(v,¯ s(p,x + t))hnk(t)dt −

H(v,¯ s(p, ˜ x + t))hnk(t)dt

  ;
Proposition 2.1 guarantees that this term will be arbitrarily small when nk becomes large
since H(v,¯ s(p,·)) is a measurable and bounded function . Thus we have established our
claim: the value of

¯ S H(v,Φ(p,x,s))dµ∗ is independent of x, and we may write it as
H∗(v,p).
We need only show that H∗ is continuous. Let (vn,p n)t e n dt o( v,p). The sequence of
functions on ¯ S, {H(vn,Φ(pn,x,·)}n≥1 is uniformly bounded since H and Φ are continuous





¯ S H(v,Φ(p,x,s)dµ∗, but this is equivalent to saying that H∗(vn,p n) converges
to H∗(v,p). QED
If we choose V to be a singleton and H to satisfy H(v,y)=y for all y in Rm, we obtain
the following corollary.
Corollary 2.5. Suppose that ¯ s : P × Rl → Rm is uniformly continuous, and for every
p, ¯ s(p,·) is bounded. Then there exists a continuous function s∗ : P → Rm and a Borel
10probability measure µ∗ on ¯ S such that for all x in Rl,

¯ S s(p,x)dµ∗ = s∗(p).
3. Some Examples
Grandmont (1992) develops a model of an exchange economy where the excess demand
function obeys gross substitubility. In essence, he considers an economy consisting of groups
of agents where the distribution of demand behavior in each group is such that the group’s
mean demand has an approximate Cobb-Douglas behavior; it is then easy to check that
an economy consisting of such groups will have an excess demand function which obeys
gross substitubility (from which one obtains the uniqueness and stability of equilibrium and
other nice properties). Our ﬁrst example applies the results of the last section to show
how Cobb-Douglas behavior, in both its approximate and exact form, can be obtained in
aggregate.
Example 1.L e t ¯ f : Rl
++ → Rl
++ be a function satisfying q · ¯ f(q)= ¯ w, where ¯ w
is some positive scalar. We interpret ¯ f(q) as the demand of an agent with income ¯ w
and facing price q. The expenditure share function of ¯ f is ¯ s : Rl → Rl
++,d e ﬁ n e db y
¯ si(x)=exi ¯ fi(ex1
,e x2
,...,exl
)/ ¯ w for i =1 ,2,...,l .S o ¯ si(x) is the share of expenditure





i=1 ¯ si(x) ≡ 1. With ¯ f




)f o ri =1 ,2,...,l.
Following the literature, we will refer to ft as an aﬃne transformation of ¯ f. It is trivial to
check that the expenditure share function of ¯ ft, which we denote by st, is related to ¯ s by
st(x)=¯ s(t + x).
The special value of aﬃne transformations lies in the fact that it preserves standard
11rationality properties that ¯ f might satisfy. In particular the following claims are easy to
check: (a) if ¯ f is generated by a utility function, so is ft; (b) if ¯ f satisﬁes the weak axiom,
so will ft; and (c) if ¯ f satisﬁes the law of demand, so will ft.3
Consider a market consisting of agents with the same income ¯ w and expenditure share
functions drawn from the set S (as deﬁned in Section 2). If the distribution of t is governed










t(x)h(t)dt.P r o p o -
sition 2.1 and the discussion following it tells us that there exists density functions h such
that sh(x) is approximately independent of x. In other words, the distribution of demand
behavior could be such that the mean expenditure devoted to any good is approximately
independent of prices. This is the central claim in Grandmont (1992).
To obtain an exact version of this result, we assume that agents’ expenditure share
functions are drawn from a slightly larger set, ¯ S. Agents in this market all have income




¯ wsi(lnq1,lnq2,...,lnql)/qi. Clearly, if s = st for some t, then fs = ft. (It is clear that
notation has been abused.) When ¯ f satisﬁes a rationality property like (a), (b) or (c), fs
need not satisfy the property exactly, but on any compact set of strictly positive prices,
it will be arbitrarily close to a function fs which does satisfy the property. This follows
easily from the fact that the members of ¯ S are either translations of ¯ s or arbitrarily close,
on compact sets, to translations of ¯ s. If the distribution of characteristics in this market




12The function ¯ s is bounded by deﬁnition. If in addition it is uniformly continuous,
then Corollary 2.5 tell us that there is a probability measure µ∗ such that

¯ S s(x)dµ∗ =
s∗, where
l
i=1 s∗i = 1. In other words, the mean expenditure devoted to any good is
independent of the prevailing price. More formally, Fi(q)=s∗i ¯ w/qi, which coincides with




The ﬁrst model of exact Cobb-Douglas aggregation is in Giraud and Maret (2001). The
assumptions we make here are generally weaker than theirs, but the stronger assumptions
in that paper allow for some stronger conclusions. Notice that our result allows the measure
µ∗ to be concentrated on just a few elements of ¯ S though, as we shall see in the next section,
there is a straightforward way of guaranteeing that it is not concentrated on just a single
function in that set. Giraud and Maret (2001) identify conditions which guarantee that µ∗
is spread out across many elements. Loosely speaking, they show that if S is compact in
the sup norm, then µ∗ can be chosen to assign a non-zero measure to open subsets of S.
Note that the assumption made in this case imposes a strong restriction on the generating
function ¯ s. Giraud and Maret (2001) also show that µ∗ can be approximated by measures of
ﬁnite support in a way which leads to approximate Cobb-Douglas behavior for the market.
(Related results on ﬁnite approximations can also be found in Quah (1997).)
Example 2. It is not always essential that mean demand obeys Cobb-Douglas behavior.
We may be interested in a weaker property. Quah (1997) considers a market where the
distribution of characteristics are such that its mean demand is approximately linear in
income; in other words, market demand takes on homothetic-like (but not necessarily Cobb-
13Douglas-like) properties.4 Once again, in the right mathematical context, this could be
sharpened to exact linearity in income.
Let ¯ g : P×R+ → Rl
+ be a function satisfying p·¯ g(p,w)=w. We interpret ˜ g as a demand
function, in which case, P (a subset of Rl
++) is the set of prices under consideration. The
expenditure share function ¯ s : P ×R → Rl
++ gives the share of expenditure devoted to each
good, so ¯ si(p,x)=pie−x¯ gi(p,ex)f o ri =1 ,2,...,l.G i v e n¯ g, we may deﬁne gt : P ×R+ → Rl
+
by gt(p,w)=e−t¯ g(p,wet). It is usual to refer to gt a homothetic transformation of ¯ g;i f¯ g is
homogeneous of degree zero, then a homothetic transformation is a special case of an aﬃne
transformation. The expenditure share function of gt, which we denote by st, is related to
¯ s by st(p,x)=¯ s(p,x + t). Once again, it is easy to check that if ¯ g satisﬁes the rationality
properties (a), (b) or (c), so will gt.
Consider a market consisting of agents with the same income, and with expenditure
share functions drawn from the set S. If the distribution of t is governed by the density
h : R → R+, then this market’s mean expenditure share at price p and when each agent
has an income of ex is sh(p,x). Proposition 2.1 and the discussion following it tells us that
there exists density functions h such that sh(p,x) is approximately independent of x.I n
other words, the mean expenditure devoted to any good is approximately independent of
income or mean demand becomes approximately homothetic.
For an exact version of this result, we assume as before that all agents have the same
income, while expenditure share functions are drawn from ¯ S. To each s in ¯ S we may
associate a demand function gs in the obvious way. A market where all agents face the
price p and have the same income w, and where expenditure share functions are drawn from
14the set ¯ S according to the probability measure µ will have aggregate demand of G(p,w)=

¯ S gs(p,w)dµ. The average expenditure share on good i when w = ex is

¯ S si(p,x)dµ.
The function ¯ s is bounded by deﬁnition. If in addition it is uniformly continuous, then
Corollary 2.5 tells us that there is a probability measure µ∗ such that

¯ S s(p,x)dµ∗ = s∗(p),
where
l
i=1 s∗i(p) = 1. In other words, the share of expenditure devoted to each good is
independent of the income ex. More formally, Gi(p,w)=s∗i(p)w/pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
In the next example, we consider a market where agents individually obey the weak ax-
iom and where a suitable distribution of characteristics will guarantee that market demand
satisﬁes a stronger property, namely, the law of demand.
Example 3. We retain the setup of Example 2. We impose the additional assumption
that P is open and convex set in Rl
++ and that ¯ g is C1, so its associated expenditure share












Deﬁne σt by σt(p,x)=¯ σ(p,x + t) and the set Σ = {σt : t ∈ R}. We denote its closure by
¯ Σ. Provided ¯ σ is uniformly continuous and ¯ σ(p,·) is bounded for all p in P, the set ¯ Σi s













To every σ in ¯ Σ we can associate the demand function gσ : P × R+ → Rl
++ in the
usual way, namely, gi
σ(p,w)=σi(p,lnw)w/pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. The function gσ is C1 and
its derivative matrix with respect to price, which we will denote by ∂pgσ(p,w), can be
15decomposed into the substitution and income eﬀect matrices. If ¯ g satisﬁes the weak axiom,
its substitution eﬀect matrix is negative semi-deﬁnite; it is not hard to check that this
implies that the substitution eﬀect matrix of gσ is also negative semi-deﬁnite.
Consider a market where σ is drawn from ¯ Σ according to the Borel probability measure
µ. Market demand is G(p,w)=

¯ Σ gσ(p,w)dµ. We wish to show that there is µ∗ such that,
when µ = µ∗, the matrix ∂pG(p,w) is negative semi-deﬁnite for all (p,w)i nP × R+. This
will guarantee that G satisﬁes the weak law of demand, i.e., (p−p )·(G(p,w)−G(p ,w)) ≤ 0
for all (p,w)a n d( p ,w)i nP × R+.
Each ∂pgσ(p,w) can be decomposed into its substitution and income eﬀect matrices,
with the former being negative semi-deﬁnite, so all that we need to do is to show that the











is a positive semi-deﬁnite matrix.
To see this, we let V = Rl and consider the map H : Rl×R2l+l2
→ R by H(v,θ)=( v·ˆ θ)2
where ˆ θ refers to the ﬁrst l entries in θ. H is clearly a continuous function, so Theorem 2.4







2 dµ∗ = H∗(v,p) ≥ 0,
where s(p,x) refers to the ﬁrst l entries of σ(p,x). Therefore, with µ = µ∗, and writing
v =( p1u1,...,plul),

























= H∗(u,p)w ≥ 0.
So we have shown that there is a distribution over ¯ Σ such that market demand G satisﬁes
the law of demand. In fact, it satisﬁes the stronger property that the matrix I(p,w)i s
negative semi-deﬁnite. This property is known as increasing dispersion and empirical tests
of the law of demand typically test this stronger property. (See W. Hildenbrand (1994)
for some empirical work and Jerison (1999) for a theoretical discussion of this property
and its variants.) It is not hard to check that by suitably re-deﬁning H we can obtain a
measure µ∗ such that G is both monotonic and a linear function of income (as in Example
2). In Quah’s (1997) model of an exchange or production economy satisfying the law of
demand, the economy consists of groups of households in which both these properties, in
their approximate versions, hold simultaneously for each group.
4. Guaranteeing Heterosis
The models presented in the last section have usually been understood as examples of
the heterotic phenomenon at work. So in Example 2, agents need not individually have
demand functions which are linear in income; it is the distribution of demand behavior in
the market which leads to that property. This is a valid interpretation, provided ¯ s satisﬁes
certain conditions.
It is best to begin with cases where such an interpretation is problematic. We conﬁne
our observations to the model described in Example 2, though these observations apply
just as aptly to Example 1. In Example 2, one trivial situation which is clearly not an
17example of heterosis, indeed not even an example of heterogeneity, is when ˜ g is itself linear
in income; then ¯ s will be independent of x and S is a singleton consisting of ¯ s. In this case,
Proposition 2.1, Theorem 2.4, and Corollary 2.5 are all trivially true, but the market, which
consists of essentially just one very well-behaved agent, is clearly not heterogenous in any
reasonable sense of the word.
A less obvious and more interesting situation has been pointed out by B. de Villemeur
(1998) and K. Hildenbrand (1998). The essence of what they are saying could be seen
in Figure 1, which shows the graph of ¯ si(p,·). Suppose we are interested in the behavior
of si
h(p,x)f o rx in some compact interval X. From Proposition 2.1 and the subsequent
discussion we know that the value of si
h(p,x)i nX becomes increasingly independent of
x as the density of h becomes increasingly ﬂat. However, in this case, there is a sense
in which it is misleading to say that this approximate independence on x is caused by
heterogeneity. The reason is that as h becomes increasingly ﬂat, it places most of its weight
on the values of t that are either very large or very small. If the function ¯ s has limits as
x goes to positive or negative inﬁnity, the behavior of st, at least within the interval X,
becomes itself increasingly independent of x for very large or small t,s i n c est(x)=¯ s(x+t)
(see Figure 1). In other words, market behavior in the set X, as represented by sh(p,x),
becomes increasingly independent of x, but only because the agents who make up that
market increasingly take on the same property in X. Such a market can be described as
heterogenous in the sense that it is composed of agents with diﬀerent expenditure share
functions, but, provided we judge agents’ demand only by its behavior in X, this is clearly
not an example of heterosis at work.
18There is another way of seeing essentially the same thing. In Figure 1, ¯ si(p,·) has a
limit of Li as x goes to inﬁnity and a limit of Mi as x goes to minus inﬁnity. It is trivial
to check that the constant functions ˆ si(p,x) ≡ Li and ˜ si(p,x) ≡ Mi are in ¯ S. So there
certainly is a measure µ∗ such that

¯ S si(p,x)dµ∗ is independent of x: simply choose a
measure which places all its weight on ˆ si(p,·)a n d˜ si(p,·). Once again there is heterogeneity
but no heterosis.
On the other hand, the function ¯ si(p,·) can look like the one depicted in Figure 2. In
this case, it is clear that si
t(p,x) will not be approximately independent of x in X for any t.
Then if si
h(p,x) is approximately independent of x - as it will be if h is suﬃciently ﬂat - this
phenomenon must arise from the distribution of t. In other words, as x is increased, si
t(p,x)
rises for some values of t and falls for other values in a way which approximately cancels
out. We may say that the agents exhibit a complementary or sign-balancing heterogeneity
in their demand behavior. (The terms are loosely borrowed from B. de Villemeur (2001)
and W. Hildenbrand and A. Kneip (1999).) This is a bona ﬁde model of heterosis.
If we wish to guarantee that we have a model of complementary heterogeneity, then we
should impose conditions on ¯ s so that it looks like Figure 2 and not like Figure 1. This is
straightforward. We say that a function H : Rl → Rm satisﬁes uniform variation if there is
δ and   such that at any point x in Rl, the compact neighborhood around x with radius δ
contains elements x  and x   satisfying |H(x  )−H(x )| >  . The property simply guarantees
that within sets of suﬃcient size, there will be a uniformly large variation in the function
H. A family H of functions from Rl to Rm satisﬁes equi-variation if there is δ and   such
t h a ta ta n yp o i n tx in Rl and for any H in H, the compact neighborhood around x with
19radius δ contains elements x  and x   (which depends on H) satisfying |H(x  )−H(x )| >  .
The next lemma has a completely trivial proof which we will omit.
Lemma 4.1 If ¯ s(p,·) satisﬁes uniform variation, then the set {s(p,·):s ∈ ¯ S} satisﬁes
equi-variation.
The import of this observation is that provided ¯ s(p,·) satisﬁes uniform variation for
some p in P, the functions s(p,·), where s is in ¯ S, are never independent of x. So that when
we ﬁnd some µ∗ such that, for all p in P,

¯ S s(p,x)dµ∗ is independent of x, this is indeed a
manifestation of heterosis arising from complementary heterogeneity.
A diﬃculty with this uniform variation requirement has been raised by some researchers
(for example, K. Hildenband (1998)): they observe that it is implausible (though not irra-
tional in the sense of violating the standard rationality properties) for expenditure shares
to behave that way, where there is no nice limiting behavior as income becomes very small
or very large. In other words, any interpretation of the models of market demand given in
Section 3 as models of complementary heterogeneity requires implausible assumptions. We
do not share this view. When one is modelling demand behavior, it is not usually demand
behavior in the entire price-income space that is being modelled, but rather the behavior
of demand in some pre-determined set of prices and income that is bounded and bounded
away from the margins (like the set X in Figure 1). One may model demand in this set by
the elements of S or its closure; whether or not the model is realistic depends on whether
the elements of S (or ¯ S) adequately represent the variety of demand behavior in that set.I t
is on this basis that one should judge the suitability of the generating function ¯ s; the real-
ism or otherwise of ¯ s as a description of a consumer’s behavior over the entire price-income
20space is not relevant in itself.5,6
CNRS UMR 7522, Bureau d’Economie Theorique et Appliquee, 61, avenue de la Foret
Noire, 67000, Strasbourg, France.; ggiraud@cournot.u-strasbg.fr
and
St Hugh’s College, Oxford, OX2 6LE. U.K.; john.quah@economics.ox.ac.uk
References
Billette De Villemeur, E. (2001): “Behavioral Complementarity (not Heterogeneity)
Causes the Law of Demand,” Personal Manuscript.
Billingsley, P. (1968): Convergence of Probability Measures. New York: Wiley.
Giraud, G. and I. Maret (2001): “Behavioral Heterogeneity in Large Economies,”
mimeo.
Grandmont, J.-M. (1992): “Transformations of the commodity space, behavioral het-
erogeneity, and the aggregation problem,” J. Econ Theory, 57, 1-35.
Hildenbrand, K. (1998): “On J. M. Grandmont’s Modelling of Behavioral Heterogene-
ity,” Bonn discussion Paper, A-580.
Hildenbrand, W. (1974): Core and Equilibria of a Large Economy. Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press.
— (1983): “On the Law of Demand,” Econometrica, Vol. 51, 997-1019.
— (1994): Market Demand. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
21Hildenbrand, W. and A. Kneip (1999): “On Behavioral Heteorgeneity,” Bonn Discus-
sion Paper, A-589.
Jerison, M. (1999): “Dispersed excess demands, the weak axiom and uniqueness of
equilibrium,” J. Math Econ., Vol. 31, 15-48.
Quah, J. K.-H. (1997): “The Law of Demand when Income is Price Dependent,” Econo-
metrica, Vol. 65, No. 6, 1421-1442.
Quah, J. K.-H. (2001): “Demand is Heterogenous in Grandmont’s Model,” Nuﬃeld
College Working Paper, W12.
Royden, H. L. (1968): Real Analysis, 2nd. edition. London: Macmillan.
22Footnotes
1. ‘Heterosis’ is not a new word, though it is fairly obscure. The Oxford English Dictionary
gives it a few diﬀerent meanings, but its most common use (and apparently even this use is
not that common) is in biology, where it means hybrid vigor. The meaning we are giving
to this word is diﬀerent, but it follows just as naturally from its Greek roots. Of course,
economists have been known to borrow words from other disciplines: ‘hysteresis’ being just
one example.
2. The crucial assumption in Hildenbrand and Kneip’s (1999) interpretation of Grandmont’s
result is that the expenditure share function generating the aﬃne class has, in a certain
sense, ﬁnitely many turning points (Assumption 3 in their paper). For a more detailed
discussion of these issues see Quah (2001).
3. A function f : Rl
++ × R+ → Rl
++ satisﬁes the weak axiom if p · f(p ,w ) ≤ p · f(p,w)
implies p  · f(p,w) >p   · f(p ,w ). It satisﬁes monotonicity or the law of demand if
(p − p ) · (f(p,w) − f(p ,w)) < 0. For a discussion of these concepts see Mas-Colell et





4. A preference generates a demand function which is linear in income if and only if it
is homothetic. For this reason and for convenience, we use the terms ‘homotheticity’ and
‘linearity in income’ interchangeably, but the reader should bear in mind that even when
market demand is linear in income it need not be generated by a preference.
5. Part of this discussion was ﬁrst reported in Quah (2001).
6. Since a homothetic or aﬃne transformation of a demand function will inherit any im-
23plausible boundary behavior it has, excluding the situation depicted in Figure 2 may be
reasonable if a model assumes agents to have demand functions which coincide with these
transformations on the entire set of prices and incomes. Indeed, this assumption is made in
Grandmont (1992) and Quah (1997), but while it simpliﬁes the exposition, in neither case
is the assumption essential. The authors were principally interested in the global unique-
ness and stability of the equilibrium price. For simplicity, consider an exchange economy.
Then the strategy is as follows. Firstly, some assumptions are made (and there are many
variations, beyond the ones supplied by those authors) which guarantee that the equilib-
rium prices lie within some compact set of strictly positive prices, P; given P, and given
the endowments of the agents, we can ﬁnd a compact interval of strictly positive incomes
which agents in the model can achieve given the prices in P. Secondly, in the set P × W,
but not necessarily outside that set, agents have demand functions which belong to homoth-
etic classes in the case of Quah (1997) and aﬃne classes in the case of Grandmont (1992).
Suitable distributional assumptions within these classes plus other assumptions then guar-
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